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International Investment Law in an Isolationist World: A Human Rights 
Perspective 
 
Abstract: 
 
Political events in 2016 marked a fundamental shift in the world order. The scale of 
the shift has precipitated claims that the world has entered into a new international 
order characterised by isolationist policies. This article addresses the validity of these 
claims with regards to international investment law. The article adopts a human rights 
perspective to argue that isolationist State conduct in international investment law can 
often be justified as an exercise of the right to economic self-determination. As the 
right to self-determination has been invoked in debates regarding international 
investment law since the 1960s and 1970s, it is suggested that some isolationist State 
practice is merely the latest manifestation of on-going policy tensions within the 
international investment law regime. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2016, the United Kingdom’s referendum result in favour of leaving the European 
Union (Brexit) and the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States 
of America (USA) significantly altered the international political landscape. In 
response, it has been claimed that these events show support for policies that can be 
characterised as ‘isolationist’.1 Additionally, it has been alleged that the current trend 
                                                        
1 J. R. Murnane, Let's Not Get Distracted by "Shiny Objects," President Trump's "America First" 
Foreign Policy is Out of Sync with the Problems of the 21st Century, American Diplomacy 31 March 
2016; accessed at http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2017/0106/oped/murnane_shiny.html, 14 
December 2017; B. Simms, America Alone, New Statesman 7-13 October 2016 24-5, 27, 29, 31; cf D. 
Blagden, Britain and the world after Brexit, 54(1) International Politics 1- 25 (2017). 
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towards ‘isolationist’ policies has resulted in the creation of a new world order.2 This 
article examines the validity of these assumptions in relation to international 
investment law (IIL).  
 
A wide variety of conduct associated with IIL has the potential to be labelled 
‘isolationist’. The type of State conduct that is most susceptible to this criticism is that 
which seeks to promote the national interest of the State to the detriment of IIL and 
the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). A State might protect its national interest 
by modifying treaty terms to limit investment protection standards, by restricting 
foreign investors’ access to dispute resolution mechanisms or by withdrawing from 
international investment agreements (IIAs) altogether. These types of actions 
undermine how IIL was envisaged to function and can therefore be understood to be 
‘isolationist’ from the viewpoint of IIL.3 This article asserts that changes to IIL aimed 
at protecting the national interest may be justified by reference to the human rights 
framework, and in particular, the right to economic self-determination. When a 
State’s population elects to adopt an economic policy that is contrary to IIL, the right 
to self-determination, when understood as a group right, can provide a State with a 
mandate to apply that policy. As such, it is doubtful whether State practice relating to 
IIL that seeks to protect the national interest can automatically be classified as 
‘isolationist’. Further, the right to self-determination played a significant role in the 
development of the contemporary IIL regime. 4  Therefore, when a human rights 
perspective is adopted, it becomes questionable whether State practice that prioritises 
the national interest has generated a ‘new’ international order. 
 
To explore these issues, this article will address what is understood by the 
term ‘isolationism’ before explaining how this concept relates to the right to                                                         
2 F. Fukuyama, US against the world? Trump’s America and the new global order, Financial Times 12 
November 2016. 
3 See Section 2 below. 
4  M. Salomon, From NIEO To Now and the Unfinishable Story of Economic Justice, 62(1) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (2013); S. Subedi, International Investment Law: 
Reconciling Policy and Principle 38 (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2016); E. Guntrip, Self-Determination 
and Foreign Direct Investment: Reimaging Sovereignty in International Investment Law, 65(4) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 839-841 (2016). 
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economic self-determination. Examples will be used to explain how recent State 
practice in IIL, that might be deemed to be isolationist, can be validated by reference 
to the right to self-determination. Finally, the article will consider the degree to which 
the phenomenon that has been identified can be described as new, or whether, as this 
author suggests, this is the latest manifestation of an on-going policy tension in IIL.  
 
2. An ‘Isolationist World’ 
 
The nationalistic agendas that underpinned the successful campaigns in both the 
Brexit referendum and the USA’s Presidential election have given rise to claims that 
we have entered a new era of globalisation. 5  Although it remains unclear what 
characterises this new phase, the descriptions proffered suggest a reduction in 
international interactions between States.6 Whilst this could be the outcome, it would 
be remiss to conclude that the world had become isolationist without reference to 
what is meant by the term ‘isolationism’.  
 
The concept of isolationism is notoriously difficult to define.7 It is usually 
associated with the reluctance of a State to engage with other States8 so as to promote 
                                                        
5 See for example, J. Tankersly, Britain’s Brexit just killed globalisation as we know it, The Sydney 
Morning Herald 26 June 2016 accessed at http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-election/britains-brexit-
just-killed-globalisation-as-we-know-it-20160626-gps0js.html 29 September 2017; R. Wigglesworth 
and M. Childs, Ray Dalio warns on new era of globalisation in retreat, Financial Times 15 November 
2016 accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/66427a0a-ab58-11e6-ba7d-76378e4fef24 29 September 
2017; L. Neville, Is This The End of Globalization?, Global Finance 8 December 2016, 10; A. 
Acharya, After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, 31(3) Ethics and 
International Affairs) 271-85 (2017). 
6 Tankersly, supra note 5; Wigglesworth and Childs, supra note 5; Neville, supra note 5; cf Achyra, 
supra note 5. 
7  M. Roskin, What “New Isolationism”? 6 Foreign Policy 118 (1972); D. H. Dunn, Isolationism 
Revisited: Seven Persistent Myths in the Contemporary American Foreign Policy Debate 31 Review of 
International Studies 240 (2005); J. S. Rofe, Isolationism and Internationalism in Transatlantic Affairs 
9 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 4-5 (2011). 
8 A. Quinn, The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy 
35 Politics & Policy 527 (2007); A. Johnstone, Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign 
Relations 9 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 10 (2011). 
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its own national agenda. As a result of its nationalistic associations,9 the term is often 
used pejoratively.10 However, any definition of isolationism is subject to contextual 
interpretation. 11  For example, the USA’s non-interventionist foreign policy with 
Europe during the 1930s is frequently cited as an accepted example of isolationist 
conduct.12 Whilst the USA did not engage with the rise of fascism in Europe at this 
time, it still retained strong economic ties in the international arena.13 Consequently, 
the definition of isolationism can be tailored to reflect non-engagement in only certain 
aspects of international affairs. Further, isolationism is relative.14 One policy may be 
more isolationist than another, but if both rely on international co-operation to varying 
degrees, it may not be accurate to describe either as isolationist (not at least without 
reference to any comparator). This relativity has resulted in claims of isolationism 
being directed towards liberal States as well as authoritarian regimes.15 Given these 
considerations, it is only possible to propose a generic, working definition of 
isolationism. For the purposes of this article, isolationism refers to when a State seeks 
to protect its national interest above the interests of the international community. This 
could be evidenced by States relying on their national interests as a justification for 
not engaging in the international arena, or citing domestic reasons for acting in a 
manner that is incompatible with the aims of their international obligations.  
 
Based on this definition, IIL evidences some isolationist practices. For 
example, the Trump administration has walked away from two mega-regional trade 
and investment agreements (the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership) and is renegotiating the terms of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.16 Trump’s policy can be considered to be isolationist given 
                                                        
9 Quinn, supra note 8, p. 528; Rofe, supra note 7, p. 2. 
10 Roskin, supra note 7, p. 118; Dunn, supra note 7, p. 243; Quinn, supra note 8, p. 527; Johnstone, 
supra note 8, p. 7. 
11 Rofe, supra note 7, p. 5. 
12 Dunn, supra note 7, p. 255; Quinn, supra note 8, p. 527; Johnstone, supra note 8, p. 9. 
13 Johnstone, supra note 8, p. 9. 
14 Roskin, supra note 5, pp. 118 – 119; Dunn, supra note 7, p. 242. 
15 See H. Turku, Isolationist States in an Interdependent World ch 2 (Farnham: Ashgate 2009). 
16 United States Trade Representative, 2017 Trade Policy Agenda and 2016 Annual Report of the 
President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program March 2017 accessed at 
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that the USA’s retraction from these instruments was explained by reference to the 
need for the USA to focus on domestic policies and to prioritise American-based 
industries.17 The denunciation of the Washington Convention18 by Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Venezuela19 on the grounds that investment arbitration removed State control 
over natural resources 20  is also illustrative of a form of isolationism. A further 
example is Australia’s policy to completely exclude investment arbitration from new 
IIAs from April 2011 to September 2013.21 Australia’s actions can be understood to 
be isolationist they could have reduced inward flows of FDI given the lack of a 
neutral, international dispute resolution forum to hear investment disputes. Such an 
approach undermines the teleology of IIL. 
 
The implementation of isolationist policies such as these can be explained by 
reference to the global, neoliberal practices that drive the operation of IIL. 22  
Neoliberal economic policy dictates that the market will allocate resources in the most 
efficient manner.23 Globalisation provided the context in which neoliberalism could 
                                                                                                                                                              
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/AnnualReport2017.pdf 29 
September 2017. 
17 ibid, 1-2. 
18 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(signed 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 (Washington Convention). 
19 Bolivia’s withdrawal from the Washington Convention took effect on 3 November 2007. Ecuador’s 
withdrawal from the Washington Convention took effect on 7 January 2010. Venezuela’s withdrawal 
from the Washington Convention took effect on 25 July 2012. 
20 For a full explanation, see S. K. Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace 
ICSID Arbitration 2 Beijing Law Review 134 (2011). 
21 L. E. Trakman and D. Musayelyan, The Repudiation of Investor–State Arbitration and Subsequent 
Treaty Practice: The Resurgence of Qualified Investor–State Arbitration 31 ICSID Rev-FILJ 196 
(2016); Edwina Khan, Australia’s Conflicting Approach to ISDS: Where to From Here? Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog 4 June 2015 accessed at 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/06/04/australias-conflicting-approach-to-isds-where-
to-from-here/ 29 September 2017. 
22 M. Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2015). 
23  ibid, 10-11; S. A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International 
Investment Agreements 13(4) Journal of International Economic Law 1041(2010). 
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operate on an international scale. 24  When applied to IIL, neoliberalism seeks to 
encourage the flow of FDI on a global scale, protect property rights and provide for 
neutral dispute settlement.25 To encourage investment flows, the IIL regime, through 
the use of IIAs,26 confers investment protection standards on foreign investors27 and 
enables foreign investors to commence investment arbitration directly against the host 
State in the event of a dispute.28 This structure was intended to encourage FDI flows 
to those States that enter into IIAs. 29  However, the interpretation of investment 
protection standards, combined with the power conferred upon foreign investors to 
challenge host State decisions, have resulted in a backlash against IIL.30 In particular, 
IIL has been criticised for investment awards that outline generous interpretations of 
investment protection standards in favour of foreign investors, which often give rise 
to an obligation on the host State to pay substantial damages.31 Host States are often 
unable to defend themselves against foreign investors’ claims as IIAs are 
asymmetrical and very rarely create obligations for foreign investors that can be 
invoked by host States. 32 Hence, States act in a variety of ways to protect their 
national interests against the potentially negative repercussions of being bound by IIL. 
This has the effect of undermining the objectives of the IIL regime and can negatively 
impact the flow of FDI. As a result, these actions are deemed to be isolationist.                                                         
24 Sornarajah, supra note 22, p. 11; S.W. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment 
Law 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009).   
25 Sornarajah, supra note 22, p. 12-13. Schill, supra note 24, p. 6. 
26 S. Subedi, (2016) International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle 114-115 (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2016).  
27 Sornarajah, supra note 22, p. 14; R. Dolzer, and C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment 
Law 14 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
28 ibid. 
29 Sornarajah, supra note 22, p. 14; L. Cotula, The New Enclosures? Polanyi, International Investment 
Law and the Global Land Rush 34(9) Third World Quarterly 1614 (2013). 
30  M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, K.-H. Chung and C. Balchin (eds) The Backlash Against Investment 
Arbitration. Perceptions and Reality (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009); A. 
Kulick, Reassertion of Control: An Introduction, in: A. Kulick (ed.), Reassertion of Control over the 
Investment Treaty Regime 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
31 M Sornarajah, Introduction, in: A. D. Mitchell, M. Sornarajah and T. Voon (eds), Good Faith and 
International Economic Law 4-5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
32 A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment 64 
(Alphen de Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009). 
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Koskenniemi highlights investment arbitration as being particularly 
problematic within the IIL regime.33 The asymmetrical nature of IIAs is identified as 
generating power differentials in investment arbitration.34 The discrepancy in power 
between the foreign investor and the host State is internalised by the host State when 
formulating policy that has the potential to detrimentally affect investment projects.35 
This results in policies that are responsive to the possible outcomes of investment 
disputes, rather than those best suited to the specific circumstances that apply to the 
State. As a consequence of host States focussing on the international implications of 
their conduct, and more specifically their potential liability, local public power has 
become far less influential. This has resulted in the detachment of locally sourced 
democratic governance from IIL, and economic globalisation more generally.36 State 
practice mirrors this description. The reasons articulated by the USA for distancing 
themselves from regional trade and investment treaties, and justifications proffered by 
those Latin American States that have denounced the Washington Convention, align 
with the sentiment that these States feel that they had ‘lost control’ over their 
economic policies by being party to key IIL treaties. Similarly, Australia’s rejection 
of investment arbitration was explained as a means of protecting its right to regulate 
in the public interest.37 Therefore, isolationism in IIL is linked to the perceived, or 
actual, loss of influence over domestic economic policy. This is manifested within the 
structures of IIL, and in particular, the use of investment arbitration, which 
necessitates that decision-making is conducted externally to the State.  
 
To re-engage with economic globalisation, it has been suggested that there 
must be enhanced public power and local self-determination in economic                                                         
33 M. Koskenniemi, It’s Not the Cases, It’s the System 18 Journal of World Investment and Trade 351 
(2017). 
34 ibid, pp. 351-352; M.-L. Jaime, Relying upon Parties;’ Interpretation in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: Filling the Gaps in International Investment Agreements 46 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 272 (2014). 
35 Koskenniemi, supra note 33, p. 352; D. Schneiderman, Resisting Economic Globalization: Critical 
Theory and International Investment Law 114-115 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).  
36 Koskenniemi, supra note 33, p. 352. 
37 Khan, supra note 21.   
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governance.38 By strengthening these procedures, both States and local communities 
are likely to feel that they are in control of globalisation, rather than being controlled 
by it. This approach may vindicate the implementation of isolationist policies in IIL at 
a domestic level. State practice that advances the national interest above FDI flows 
could be understood as embodying a move towards the re-claiming of local economic 
and democratic governance. If the reclaiming of local power in this manner is 
conceptualised as an exercise of the right to economic self-determination, it becomes 
questionable whether this type of conduct can be classified as isolationist.  
 
To reframe isolationist State practice as an exercise of the right to economic 
self-determination, it is necessary to adopt a human rights perspective. The right to 
economic self-determination is recognised in Common Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 39  and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 40  The centrality of the right to self-
determination to the human rights regime is evident in claims that it amounts to an 
obligation erga omnes. 41  Therefore, framing economic self-determination as the 
exercise of a human right is not problematic. It is necessary to conceptualise the right 
to economic self-determination as a group right42 so that the State can implement 
policies based on the exercise of this right in the international arena. This is achieved 
by linking the right to economic self-determination to the right to political self-
determination. The right to economic self-determination entails that the local 
population must be given free choice to decide their preferred economic policy 
through the constitutional and political structures of the State, 43 which is usually 
                                                        
38 Koskenniemi, supra note 33, p. 352. 
39 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed on 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
40 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (signed on 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. 
41 ICJ 30 June 1995, Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para 29. 
42 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23, Article 27 (Fiftieth session, 1994), Compilation of 
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 38 (1994) para 3.1. See also, B. Mello, Recasting the Right to Self-
Determination: Group Rights and Political Participation 30(2) Social Theory and Practice 193 (2004).  
43 Guntrip, supra note 4, pp. 843-844. 
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achieved through the election of a representative government.44 When informing the 
local population about the policies, the State must be transparent.45 When the local 
population select their preferred economic approach through the applicable 
constitutional process, the State is conferred with a mandate to implement that 
economic strategy.46 The right to economic self-determination is a continuing right, 
so the local population can change their mind and utilise the constitutional procedures 
of the State to evidence their newly preferred economic policy at a later stage.47 As 
such, the right to economic self-determination is linked to the right to political self-
determination, but focuses on the right of the population to select their preferred 
economic policy.48 Most importantly for this note, the right to self-determination can 
support the adoption of an isolationist economic policy. If a State engages with their 
constitutional processes, and as a result receives a mandate to pursue an isolationist 
policy, the outcome can be justified on the basis of the population exercising their 
right to self-determination.  
 
It is important to emphasise that not all isolationist policies are defensible by 
reference to the right to economic self-determination.49 All elements of the right must 
be met. For example, there has been discussion as to whether Brexit was democratic 
in light of alleged misrepresentations made by both campaigns before the 
referendum.50 Misrepresentations are unlikely to meet the transparency requirements                                                         
44 ibid, p. 844. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid. 
47 ibid, p. 845. 
48 ibid, p. 843. 
49 See D. Desierto, The Revived Debate over Development and Human Rights: Self-Determination, 
Sovereignty and Non-Discrimination, EJIL:Talk! blog 18 January 2018, accessed at  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-revived-debate-over-development-and-human-rights-sequenced-or-
selective-compliance/ 20 January 2018. 
50 See House of Commons Treasury Committee, The economic and financial costs and benefits of the 
UK’s EU membership: First Report of Session 2016-17 26 May 2016 ch 2 acessed at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtreasy/122/122.pdf 29 September 2017; S. 
Tierney, Was the Brexit Referendum Democratic? United Kingdom Constitutional Law Association 
Blog 25 July 2016 accessed at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/25/stephen-tierney-was-the-
brexit-referendum-democratic/ 29 September 2017; A. Renwick and M. Russell, We need to talk about 
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associated with the right to self-determination. Nonetheless, in less controversial 
cases, State practice in IIL has been deemed to be isolationist by protecting the 
national interest to the detriment of the continued flow of FDI. The question then 
arises whether these practices are isolationist in the pejorative sense, or can be 
supported by reference to the right to economic self-determination. To examine this 
further, two recent examples of State practice in IIL will be used to highlight how the 
right to economic self-determination can be seen as a justification for what might 
otherwise be considered to be isolationist conduct. 
 
2.1 South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act 2015 
 
FDI was viewed as an important aspect of South Africa’s post-apartheid development. 
It was considered to be a means of triggering South Africa’s economic growth and 
enabling South Africa to engage in the international economic arena.51 However, by 
the late 1990s, it became apparent that the terms of the IIAs South Africa had 
negotiated were incompatible with its Constitution.52 Further, South Africa’s Broad 
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 53 which gave effect to an affirmative 
action plan intended to remedy the effects of apartheid, provided for positive 
discrimination contrary to the terms of investment protection standards in South 
Africa’s IIAs.54  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
our democracy The Constitution Unit 6 November 2016 accessed at https://constitution-
unit.com/2016/11/06/we-need-to-talk-about-our-democracy/ 29 September 2017. 
51 E. C. Schlemmer, An Overview of South Africa’s Investment Treaties and Investment Policy 31 
ICSID Rev-FILJ 168 (2016). 
52 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996). See M. Mossallam, Process Matters: South 
Africa’s Experience Exiting its BITs, The Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper 
2015/97 January 2015 7-8  accessed at 
https://www.geg.ox.ac.uk/sites/geg/files/GEG%20WP_97%20Process%20matters%20-
%20South%20Africas%20experience%20exiting%20its%20BITs%20Mohammad%20Mossallam.pdf 
29 September 2017. 
53 Act 53 (2003). 
54 Schlemmer, supra note 51, p. 173. 
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The initiation of the Piero Foresti claim55  in 2007 highlighted South Africa’s 
potential liability under its IIAs.56 The basis of this claim was that the effect of the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2004 amounted to expropriation, 
as it required the foreign investors to transfer shares to minority groups in accordance 
with South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment policies. 57  The claim was 
discontinued in 2010,58 but in response, South Africa commenced a review of its FDI 
programme and its involvement in IIL more generally. The review was based on 
interviews with its international trade division and discussions with policy makers.59 
At this point, the review was opened for public comment and South Africa engaged 
with a range of stakeholders.60 A final version of the review, taking into account 
stakeholder feedback, was considered by Cabinet.61 
 
Based on the review, South Africa began to terminate its IIAs.62 The intention 
was to replace them with domestic legislation that set out investment protection 
standards and dispute resolution procedures.63 After some delay, this legislation took 
the form of the Protection of Investment Act 2015.64 The Protection of Investment 
Act 2015 has significantly altered key aspects of how IIL usually functions. With 
regards to dispute resolution, foreign investors must exhaust all local remedies prior 
                                                        
55  ICSID, Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/07/1. 
56 Mossallam, supra note 52, p. 9. 
57 ICSID, 4 August 2010, Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v Republic of South Africa, Award 
ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/1, accessed at  https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0337.pdf 20 January 2018, paras 54 and 78. 
58 ibid, para 82. 
59 R. Williams, The Third Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators Nothing 
Sacred: Developing Countries and the Future of International Investment Countries, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development November 2009 5 accessed at 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/meterial/developing_countries_and_the_future_of_IIAs.pdf 29 
September 2017.  
60 ibid. 
61 Mossallam, supra note 52, p. 12. 
62 ibid. 
63 Schlemmer, supra note 51, p. 189. 
64 Act 22 (2015). 
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to proceeding to arbitration65 (a requirement that is either dispensed with entirely, or 
significantly reduced, in most IIAs). Exhausting local remedies can be time 
consuming for foreign investors, and may act as a disincentive to invest given the 
uncertainty associated with bringing an investment claim in foreign courts. Should 
this condition be complied with, arbitration is permitted, but only between the home 
State and the host State, with the consent of the South African Government.66 To 
make use of this procedure, foreign investors would need to rely on diplomatic 
protection, which necessitates that their home State consents to bring a claim on 
behalf of a foreign investor. As a result, whether a claim is heard by an arbitral panel 
is at the discretion of the States involved, rather than being a right conferred upon 
foreign investors. This dispute resolution procedure applies to any new investments in 
South Africa.67 
 
The Protection of Investment Act 2015 has been criticised for negatively 
impacting FDI flows. Members of the South African Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, 68  the European Chamber of Commerce and the American Chamber of 
Commerce view the Protection of Investment Act 2015 as a deterrent to investment.69 
They are particularly critical of South Africa’s approach given that South Africa is 
slipping down investment rankings as a desirable location for FDI and the incoming 
value of FDI has dropped significantly in recent years. 70  The essence of these 
critiques is that, by withdrawing from its IIAs, and creating a less attractive dispute 
resolution system for foreign investors, South Africa is prioritising its national interest 
over FDI flows and the IIL regime as a whole. Hence, these views imply that South 
Africa is being isolationist. 
 
                                                        
65 ibid, s.12(5). 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid, s.15. 
68 Mossallam, supra note 52, pp. 5, 15-16. 
69 M. Masamba, South Africa’s new investment law: Safe hands?, This is Africa 23 February 2016 
accessed at http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/News/South-Africa-s-new-investment-law-Safe-
hands?ct=true 29 September 2017. 
70 D. Thomas, Business frets over South Africa law, African Business March 2016 20-21. 
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However, by taking a human rights perspective, South Africa’s actions can be 
framed as the exercise of the right to economic self-determination. Following a 
transparent review of its obligations in IIL,71 South Africa has taken the decision to 
focus on its social policies at the expense of attracting FDI. It has achieved this 
through the enactment of domestic legislation in accordance with its Constitution. It 
has been claimed that this Act was not the subject of full parliamentary consultation.72 
This may be problematic as, if this is correct, it may reduce the democratic legitimacy 
of the Act. Nevertheless, through consultations and the legislative process, the local 
population was able to engage with the formulation of economic policy, both directly 
and through the operation of democratically appointed representatives. Therefore, the 
adoption of the Protection of Investment Act 2015 can be justified as an act of self-
determination. 
 
2.2. Wallonia and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
 
When the European Commission declared the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA) to be a mixed agreement, it triggered the requirement 
that all European Union (EU) Member States agree to CETA in order for it to apply in 
its entirety.73 The procedure to be followed by Member States to consent to mixed 
agreements is governed by their Constitution.74 The Belgian Constitution confers 
power over regional economic matters to its regional parliaments.75 Consequently, for 
                                                        
71 Mossallam, supra note 52, p. 17. 
72 Schlemmer, supra note 51, p. 189; Thomas, supra note 70. 
73 European Commission, European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada 
trade deal, 5 July 2016 accessed at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm 29 
September 2017. 
74 European Parliament, Ratification of international agreements by EU Member States, Briefing 
November 2016 accessed at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593513/EPRS_BRI(2016)593513_EN.pdf 
29 September 2017. 
75 See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ C 
115/47, Declaration 51 ‘Declaration by the Kingdom of Belgium on national Parliaments’ which states 
that ‘Belgium wishes to make clear that, in accordance with its constitutional law, not only the 
Chamber of Representatives and Senate of the Federal Parliament but also the parliamentary 
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the federal Belgian Government to agree to CETA, it needed the agreement of all of 
its regional parliaments.  
 
In 2016, the Parliament of Wallonia expressed concerns over terms of CETA. 
In particular, it was unclear of the potential implications for farmers in the region.76 
These apprehensions appeared to reflect issues regarding the distribution of wealth 
from the agreement, as the Wallonian economy, which had historically been based 
around farming and industry, was in decline.77 The Parliament also expressed wider 
concerns regarding the provisions in CETA addressing environmental and labour 
standards, 78  as well as the inclusion of an investment court as the forum for 
disputes.79 The overall debate may have resulted from a sentiment that Belgium had 
engaged in little democratic debate over free trade and the impact of globalisation 
more generally. 80 Based on these issues, on 14 October 2016, the Parliament of 
Wallonia voted against accession to CETA. 81 In an attempt to clarify the scope of the 
provisions, and to explain how CETA would function, an interpretative declaration 
was provided, but the regional assembly remained unsatisfied. 82  Further minor 
modifications were made to the text of CETA and it was not until 28 October 2016 
that the Parliament’s concerns were addressed and CETA was accepted.83  
                                                                                                                                                               
assemblies of the Communities and the Regions act, in terms of the competences exercised by the 
Union, as components of the national parliamentary system or chambers of the national Parliament.’ 
76 V. Dendrinou and V. Pop, Upstart Belgian Region Stymies EU, Canada Trade Deal; Wallonia’s 
refusal to approve CETA thwarts bloc’s ability to negotiate multinational economic agreements, Wall 
Street Journal 21 October 2016. 
77 S. Hayden, Why Wallonia wobbled, Maclean’s 14 November 2016. 
78 J Brunsden, Belgium’s Walloon parliament blocks EU-Canada free-trade deal FT.com 14 October 
2016 accessed at https://www.ft.com/content/df6841f4-113e-3b56-9559-61bcc6c3ed11?mhq5j=e7 1 
October 2017; Anon, Hot-air Walloons; The Canada-EU trade deal, The Economist 22 October 2016 
46. 
79 Dendrinou and Pop, supra note 76; Anon, supra note 78. 
80 Dendrinou and Pop, supra note 76.  
81 46 against accession, 16 for, with 1 abstention. 
82 Brunsden, supra note 78; N. Drozdiak, V. Pop and V. Dendrinou, EU Sets Belgium an Ultimatum on 
CETA; EU-Canada trade deal has been blocked by Belgian region of Wallonia, Wall Street Journal 23 
October 2016. 
83 Hayden, supra note 77. 
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The stance taken by the Parliament of Wallonia was widely criticised. It was 
alleged that the Walloons were failing to comprehend the wider context in which 
CETA was operating. 84  Critics argued that sovereignty and democracy must be 
compromised so as to gain the benefits of globalisation.85 Based on the regional 
assembly’s conduct, it was suggested that power should be shifted back to Brussels to 
prevent regional parliaments from blocking consent to beneficial treaties, such as 
CETA.86 The foundation of these critiques is that Wallonia was taking an isolationist 
view to protect the interests of the Walloons that prevented Belgium, and the EU, 
from gaining the benefits of CETA. 
 
However, the acts of the Parliament of Wallonia can also be understood as the 
exercise of the right to economic self-determination. The regional assembly is 
conferred with power over the region’s economic and international trade matters. 
Therefore, the regional assembly acted in accordance with the powers conferred upon 
it by the Belgian Constitution. The position taken by the Parliament was reflective of 
the broader views of the region that it represented. 87  As such, it possessed the 
mandate to, at a minimum, query how the terms of CETA would impact the 
community that it represented. It was only when it was satisfied with the outcome of 
these discussions that it agreed to the terms of CETA. Hence, by taking a human 
rights standpoint, Wallonia’s isolationist behaviour can be understood as the exercise 
of the right to self-determination. 
 
2.3 Isolationism as Self-Determination 
 
The dynamics that underpin the operation of IIL can lead to States choosing to act 
contrary to IIL’s purposes in an attempt to control their domestic economic policies. 
These practices can be attributed to the detachment that has arisen between local level 
governance and the process of economic globalisation. If isolationist State conduct is 
understood as a means of regaining control, it is possible to re-frame State actions as 
the exercise of the right to economic self-determination. The two examples outlined                                                         
84 Anon, Making sense of the Wallonian veto, The Economist 24 October 2016. 
85 ibid; Anon, supra note 78. 
86 Anon, supra note 84. 
87 Hayden, supra note 77. 
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above illustrate how the right to economic self-determination can provide an 
alternative rationale for isolationist actions. In each instance, conduct that sought to 
protect a State’s national interest may be deemed by some to be isolationist as it could 
deter foreign investors and reduce global flows of FDI. However, if a human rights 
viewpoint is adopted, the same practices can be justified by reference to the right to 
economic self-determination. Consequently, it is a matter of perspective as to whether 
acting in the national interest in IIL amounts to isolationism, or can be considered to 
be the exercise of the right to economic self-determination.  
 
3. A ‘New International Order’? 
 
If isolationist behaviour in IIL is linked to the right to economic self-determination, 
the further issue arises as to whether this results in a ‘new international order’. The 
development of the IIL regime exhibited on-going tension between the goals of 
encouraging FDI and protecting the national interest. As such, current State practice 
may be the latest manifestation of a historical trend within this field of international 
law. 
 
The protection of the national interest was most prominent during the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1960s and 1970s. In response to 
decolonisation, newly independent States sought to achieve economic independence 
in addition to their political independence.88 Collectively, newly independent States 
used their numerical advantage in the United Nations to pass General Assembly 
resolutions to pursue their aims. 89  The right to self-determination was expressly 
referenced in the text of these resolutions to justify their right to expropriate foreign 
investments.90 Although the NIEO never materialised, the use of a central human                                                         
88 Guntrip, supra note 4, p. 839. 
89  UNGA, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, (A/RES/S-
6/3201); UNGA, Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
(A/RES/S-6/3202); UNGA, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, (A/RES/29/3281). 
90  UNGA, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, (A/RES/S-
6/3201) arts 4(a), 4(d), 4(e); UNGA, Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (A/RES/S-6/3202) section VIII; UNGA, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, (A/RES/29/3281) arts 1, 2(1). 
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right as the legal foundation for their claims set the scene for what would be an on-
going policy battle within IIL between encouraging the flow of FDI and maintaining 
sufficient policy space for States to act in the national interest. 
 
The current wave of ‘isolationist’ conduct arises in a different context to that 
which existed at the time that States pursued the creation of the NIEO. The on-going 
process of decolonisation provided a unifying factor amongst States with otherwise 
divergent interests.91 As such, there was a singular, shared ‘national’ interest, which 
was economic independence. Each State’s national interests have become far more 
nuanced in the 50 years since the NIEO was proposed. During the NIEO, capital 
exporting States were primarily developed States, meaning that newly independent 
States were potentially subject to exploitation.92 Investment flows are now far more 
dispersed with investment flows occurring between developing States and between 
developed States. 93  Consequently, the divide between developing and developed 
States within the IIL regime is less clear-cut. Nevertheless, the foundational elements 
of the current ‘isolationist’ policies are fundamentally similar to that found during the 
NIEO. States are seeking to act in a manner that reflects their particular economic, 
political, cultural and social situations. Although these situations vary from State to 
State, in essence, States wish to feel in control of how they develop without outside 
interference. The right to self-determination gives effect to this sentiment by enabling 
a State’s population to decide what policies are most appropriate to achieve the 
State’s goals. As a result, the examples discussed above are merely new 
manifestations of the same concerns expressed during the NIEO, but in response to 
different pressures.94   
                                                         
91 J. Toye, Assessing the G77: 50 years after UNCTAD and 40 years after the NIEO, 35 Third World 
Quarterly 1767 (2014). 
92 See L. S. Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITs for the International Investment Regime: A 
Quantitative Analysis, 30 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business103-108 (2010). 
93 K. Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding 
of Capital 91 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013); Y Radi, International Investment Law 
and Development: A history of two concepts, in: S.W. Schill, C. J. Tams and R. Hofmann (eds), 
International Investment Law and Development: Bridging the Gap 86 (Cheltenham/Northampton: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
94 This is not to suggest that the colonial foundations of the modern IIL regime are no longer relevant. 
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Consequently, whether a new world order has resulted depends on how you 
define ‘new’. Aspects of the current wave of States protecting their national interests 
differ to the previous incarnations. The process of decolonisation is less of a unifying 
experience for States 50 years later and the flow of FDI has become more dispersed. 
However, at the essence of IIL practice, there remains an on-going tension between 
encouraging investment flows and the right to self-determination. Current State 
practice is merely the latest manifestation of these competing policy views in IIL.  
 
4. Conclusions: Isolationism in International Investment Law from a Human 
Rights Perspective 
 
Whether it is accurate to describe State practice that undermines the operation of IIL 
as isolationist is a matter of perception. When isolationism is understood as 
prioritising the national interest above international obligations to encourage the flow 
of FDI, isolationist practices do exist in IIL. However, if a human rights perspective is 
adopted, the right to self-determination provides a framework that can reformulate 
how ‘isolationist’ practices are understood. The use of human rights in this manner is 
not new. It formed the foundation of the modern IIL regime when it was raised during 
discussions regarding the NIEO. Current discussions regarding isolationism form part 
of the on-going debate in IIL. 
 
Despite the consistent role of the right to self-determination in the 
development of IIL, it often goes unrecognised. This is because State conduct in IIL is 
not regularly considered from a human rights viewpoint. Acknowledging the role that 
perspective can play in categorising State conduct in IIL can potentially lead to 
reform. In a fragmented international legal order, it is necessary to take into account 
the competing aims of the regimes in international law to produce coherence. This 
requires an understanding that behaviour perceived to be undesirable from the 
standpoint of one regime in international law may be justifiable by reference to 
another regime. It is by acknowledging various viewpoints that the motivations of the 
actors in the international law arena can be understood. It is only at this stage that 
international law can evolve. For IIL, understanding varied perspectives, including 
that of human rights, can assist the regime to create an appropriate balance between 
FDI and other State interests that may be constrained by IIL. The repetition of the 
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same debate from the NIEO indicates that the balance between investment flows and 
the national interest has not yet been achieved within the IIL regime. In short, the 
right to economic self-determination not only alters how a State’s actions in IIL are 
viewed, it also provides a mechanism by which States, through the political acts of 
their populations, can protect their national interests in pursuit of a more nuanced IIL 
regime. 
